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Cultural and racial diversity is increasingly becoming a reality in many countries worldwide, to the extent 
that most every mental health professional will treat patients from other countries, cultures and or races. 
Research from both the U.S. and Europe indicates that immigrants and racial minority patients receive a 
lower quality of care, which may in part be related to a lack of professional competence. Few, if any, 
professional training programs prepare trainees to work with racial or cultural diversity. Cultural 
competence training represents an approach to reduce health disparities framed in the context of the 
conceptual approach to culture, diversity, and difference. This article presents an interpretive-relational 
approach to cultural competence conceptualized as a process of self-introspection rather than a knowledge 
gathering. Disparities are understood to stem from both cultural and racial difference, and to that end, the 
basic concepts of culture and race are defined and their relationship to health disparities explored. 
Cultural competence training, it is argued, must strive to provide trainees with the tools necessary to 
overcome the principle barriers to the reception of quality mental health care, and can do so by focusing 
on the knowledge, skills, and attitudes necessary for this process. Because of cultural differences in the 
way in which mental distress is experienced, expressed, and explained, and because of cultural variation 
in the expectations of both course and treatment, clinicians must develop a knowledge base about these 
underlying mechanisms.  As racial prejudice contributes significantly to health disparities, it is essential 
that training is provided that effectively works to reduce the negative impact of racial prejudice rather 
than a narrative focused on its suppression.  
 
 
Key words: cultural competence; diversity training; transcultural psychiatry; racial prejudice. 
 
 
In the face of cultural and racial diversity that is increasingly the reality in mental health care in much of 
the world, “cultural competency training” (or some derivative thereof) has become one of the most highly 
recommended means of addressing the challenges that said diversity presupposes (Bhui, Warfa, Edonya, 
McKenzie, & Bhugra, 2007; Qureshi, Collazos, Ramos, & Casas, 2008). The need for cultural 
competency training in psychiatry is very simply a function of the barriers to quality mental health care 
for ethnic minority and migration patients. Large scale research reports carried out in the UK (Department 
of Health, 2003; Healthcare Commission, 2005) and the US (Institute of Medicine, 2002)  and diverse 
studies in Europe (Lindert, Schouler-Ocak, Heinz, & Priebe, 2008) demonstrate that health disparities are 
present in the mental health care system (see also chapter Schouler-Ocak). That is to say, access to mental 
health services, entry into the services, diagnosis, treatment, and adherence are all of a poorer quality than 
that of the “mainstream” white population. 
 
Research on cultural competence in mental health care is relatively scant (Bhui, et al., 2007; Vega, 2005), 
and would appear to be related to methodological challenges which pertain to the isolation of the 
“ingredients” that actually impact treatment outcome (Brach & Fraserirector, 2000). Two studies indicate 
that clients who rate their psychotherapists as more culturally competent are more satisfied with the 
therapy received (Constantine, Kindaichi, Arorash, Donnelly, & Jung, 2002; Fuertes & Brobst, 2002), 
although in these studies no objective measure for therapist cultural competence was used. Without 
specific reference to cultural competence, various studies of some form of cultural adaptation in 
psychotherapy indicate that treatment that is responsive to cultural difference, in the broadest sense, can 
be more effective than treatment as usual (Tervalon & Murray-Garcia, 1998). There is no shortage of 
research indicating that responsiveness and sensitivity to difference enhances treatment, which provides 
the basis for some of what is presented here. At the same time, most every competency model is 
predicated on inferences as to what constitutes cultural competence rather than any clear empirical 
evidence (Omi & Winat). 
 
What remains certain, without or without a formalized research base, is that clinicians need to be trained 
to work with racial and cultural diversity, although as will be suggested below, “all mental health 
interactions are intercultural”. That is to say, it will be argued that the competencies discussed in this 
paper have applicability to everyday work as we propose that cultural competence should be 
conceptualized as a process of self-introspection rather than a knowledge gathering. We also contend that 
the most important barrier to effective care is a poor or compromised therapeutic relationship (Lindert, et 
al., 2008; Qureshi & Collazos, 2011), such that cultural competence training is in the service of 
developing the capacity to build a solid working alliance with all patients, regardless of cultural or racial 
background. The same fundamental issues are at play in the work with all patients, even if the disparities 
diminish as cultural and racial differences between client and clinician diminishes. All mental health care 
is “multicultural”, because all people are “cultural”, and culture is perhaps best understood subjectively. 
Each individual has been socialized into a micro-culture, and as such the good clinician is always 
attending to and able to respond to the particularities of each individual patient, taking context into 
account; general clinical competence, then, implicitly demands cultural competence. 
 
Some 30 years after Sue et al. published their ground-breaking position paper entitled Cross-cultural 
counselling competencies (1982), there exist a wide array of cultural competence models as well as local 
training approaches, only some of which have been formally incorporated into the accreditation of 
professional training programs, as is the case in American psychology (Committee on Accreditation, 
2005). The recommendations made in this paper are a response to the continental European context in 
which cultural competence remains a relatively recent concept, and although recognized, to the authors’ 
knowledge is not required for accreditation. To that end, the discussion of this paper, although applicable 
in any sort of training context, is developed with a view to post-graduate, continuing education training. 
 
The basic issues of interest in cultural competence training are (1) that there is considerable variation in 
how a person experiences, expresses and explains distress as well as in their expectations about treatment, 
and that (2) clinicians need be mindful that their preconceptions and prejudices may interfere with their 
capacity to engage with and “see” the patient—are applicable in all clinical encounters. 
 
1. A note on terminology 
 
A central yet perhaps under addressed component of cultural competence is terminological and 
conceptual; how key terms and concepts are understood largely circumscribe how cultural competence 
training will be carried out. To that end, in the interests of developing solid trainig programs, it may  be 
worth exploring some terminological and conceptual conundrums that haunt the field of “transcultural 
psychiatry”. The specific population of interest (i.e. the population of interest for transcultural psychiatry) 
itself is rather difficult to specify, as are the operational variables. Culture, ethnicity, immigration, race, 
poverty, minority status, and social exclusion include some of the primary “factors” or “constructs” or 
“variables” that are at issue, however, few are well defined, and some, such as race, are hotly contested 
(Omi & Winat, 1993). Even the specific name of the field is contested (e.g. transcultural or cultural 
psychiatry; cross-cultural versus cultural psychology; multicultural counselling etc.), and indeed replete 
with disagreements as to whether they constitute distinct but overlapping fields of study, or, rather are 
like a rose by any other name. Any of the names listed all focus on “culture”, which raises the question 
about “race”, further confounding the issue. 
 
The concept of “health disparities” at least as developed in much of the literature differentiates between 
two population groupings, one of which is identified as subject to systematic disadvantage in mental 
health care; have and have-nots. In the UK and North America, the “haves” are some variation on 
“Whites” or “European-Americans” whereas the “have-nots” are generally “ethnic minorities”, “people of 
colour” or “Black British”. On the continent the “haves” are the “autochthonous” population and the 
“have-nots” are immigrants. Notwithstanding this differentiation, there are multiple factors related to 
“health disparities”, which are not reducible to simple and neat categories. Poverty, poor housing, 
underemployment, irregular immigration status, traumatic experiences, lower education, and other 
characteristics associated with marginalization are often coincident with immigration or ethnic minority 
status but by no means inherently related. Most categories used in transcultural psychiatry are 
problematic, replete with both stricter denotations and broader, more enigmatic connotations. For 
example, in much of Europe, the term “immigrant” implicitly includes poverty and political instability; 
“culture” on the other hand, tends to be exoticized and essentially the dominion of the “ethnic other” (as if 
the European mental health professional’s culture is in effect the default, and invisible at that). 
Furthermore, much of the study of culture and mental health implicitly assumes both homogenous and 
discrete groups. Publications abound that characterize groups according to various dimensions or put 
them into certain categories (“Counseling Asian Americans” or a recent publication in Science, 
“Differences between “tight” and “loose” cultures: A 33 nation study”, Gelfand et al., 2011). It is 
apparently assumed that individuals can be unproblematically identified as a member of a specific 
“cultural” or “ethnic” group on the one hand, and, on the other, that group membership is in some 
capacity meaningful in that it confers on a given individual certain characteristics. This would be an 
example of a “totalizing typology” which implicitly confers explanatory power on the group category in 
question. Such an approach runs the risk of treating group membership as a psychological characteristic 
on the one hand, an, on the other, that group boundaries are discrete and unproblematic. In this day and 
age of globalization, neo-liberalism, and world-wide migrations, the very notion of a discrete and 
homogenous group is increasingly untenable (Bhugra & Mastrogianni, 2004). 
 
For the purposes of this article, two broad, contested, and decidedly imperfect constructs will be used in 
the discussion of cultural competence, namely culture and race. “Culture” itself would appear to be a 
more palatable construct, in which health disparities are broadly understood to be a function of “cultural 
differences” in terms of experience, expression, explanation and expectations related to mental health and 
its care. “Race”, considerably less palatable, is nonetheless increasingly identified as the more basic 
crucible of disparities, which is related not to ”inner” difference on the part of the patient but rather to 
differential treatment on the part of society, institutions, and clinicians. 
 
Clarification of these two constructs is central to cultural competence, not simply for conceptual elegance 
but also because both the specific conceptions themselves as well as the differential manner of 
engagement with the two in and of itself will have an impact on how training proceeds and how one will 
enact cultural competence. To that extent, prior to entering into the relevant competencies, it may be 




Culture is a highly complex construct, to the extent that anthropologists have extensively debated its 
meaning, use, and relevance to the extent that some even called for its abandonment (Brightman, 1995). 
Given psychology’s and psychiatry’s penchant for the “scientific method”, culture has often been 
quantified, however, with no consensus as to what sort of variable it might “really” be. For the purposes 
of cultural competency training, the culture construct is central, and its conceptualization will inevitably 
impact many aspects of how clinicians view the very complex and fuzzy relationship between culture, the 
person, and psychopathology. Because of the relative importance of meaning in clinical communication, 
the following definition of culture is provided: 
 
“A context of more or less known symbols and meanings that persons dynamically create and 
recreate for themselves in the process of social interaction. Culture is thus the orientation of a 
people’s way of feeling, thinking, and being in the world—their unself-conscious medium of 
experience, interpretation, and action. As a context, culture is that through which all human 
experience and action—including emotions—must be interpreted. This view of culture attempts 
to take into consideration the quality of cultures as something emergent, contested, and temporal, 
thereby allowing theoretical breathing space for individual and gender variability and avoiding 
notions of culture as static, homogenous, and necessarily shared or even coherent” (Jenkins, 
1996, p. 74). 
 
From this perspective, culture is about how we experience and make sense of the world. At the same time 
culture is not to be reified, or frozen, or even unified. To that end the very notion of “knowing” a culture 
becomes  a highly dubious if not counter-conceptual project, precisely because culture is much more a 
socially given idiographic process, context, or condition than any sort of knowable entity. Culture is of 
interest for clinicians in the context of ones encounter, interaction, interpretation, and sense-making with 




Race is a decidedly contested construct, largely because of its historical association with biology and 
behaviour. Few would argue that race is a “real” construct at all, however, there is no agreement as to 
whether it should stand as a category in the human sciences. Concerned about its use to disempowered or 
disadvantage, it is often argued that the construct should be abandoned, yet at the same time, doing so 
renders complicated addressing racism, as Smedley & Smedley (2005) argue in an article aptly entitled, 
Race as biology is fiction, racism as a social problem is real. Because of the very strong indications that 
racism is a central part of health disparities, replacing it with “ethnicity” appears to serve to divert 
attention from the issue at hand. To that end, the following definition thematizes the dialectical and 
political nature of the race construct: 
 
 
“Race is a dynamic set of historically derived and institutionalized ideas and practices that (1) 
sorts people into ethnic groups according to perceived physical and behavioural human 
characteristics; (2) associates differential value, power, and privilege with these characteristics 
and establishes a social status ranking among the different groups; and (3) emerges (a) when 
groups are perceived to pose a threat (political, economic, or cultural) to each other’s world view 
or way or life; and/or (b) to justify the denigration and exploitation (past, current, or future) of, 
and prejudice toward, other groups” (Markus, 2008, p. 654). 
 
Race, then, for our purposes, is strictly a socio-political construct, however, a social construct the very 
existence of which is predicated on power, on control of, and access to resources. To that end, “races” and 
their delineation are always political. 
 
2. Background on cultural competence training 
 
The need for cultural competence derives from the existence of health disparities; patients would receive 
higher quality treatment were specialists to have better competences. Over the past 30 or so years, a 
variety of approaches have been taken, which have oscillated between a more “race-based” approach and 
a “culturalist” approach (Carter, 1995; Carter & Qureshi, 1995). Gregg and Saha (2006) make the very 
powerful point that disparities are due to both, however, it may be that “race” paradigm is generally 
eschewed in favour of the culturalist perspective as a means of avoiding the rather more uncomfortable 
issues related to racism (Helms, 1994; Smith, Constantine, Graham, & Dize, 2008). Present in the overall 
discourse are differences on both, situating the roots of and solutions to health disparities, as well as more 
powerful political and perhaps even psychological factors. 
 
The culturalist approach holds that health disparities are largely due to differences in how 
psychopathology is both expressed and explained. Patients from “other” cultures are misdiagnosed, 
misunderstood, because their manner of living mental distress is distinct from that standard to Western 
trained practitioners and to “psychiatry” as a Western phenomenon. The most important manner, then, of 
reducing disparities from this perspective is by educating clinicians about the ways in which culture 
influences the experience, expression and explanation of mental distress along with the expectations 
about treatment, prognosis, and the course of illness. Traditionally, this has often meant focussing on the 
“cultural characteristics” of the primary patient groups in the region. 
 
2.1 Cultural competence training in a nutshell 
 
Multicultural counselling competency models, like most competence models, consist of the three domains 
of knowledge or cognitive competence, skills or procedural competence, and attitudes and beliefs or 
attitudinal competence. Applied to the two health disparity domains identified, “knowledge” is 
particularly germane to the culturalist perspective, which demands attention to cultural aspects of 
experience, expression, expression and expectations, whereas attitudes are particularly applicable to the 
race-based approach, which demands attention to racial prejudice. Skills are applicable to both the 
culturalist and race-based approaches. Cultural knowledge, as Sue and Zane (1987) pointed out, is distal 
from the clinical encounter, and thus must be effectively applied in order to have any therapeutic value. 
Identification and modification of racial prejudice and ethnic countertransference is a very demanding and 
complex process, and requires considerable skill for its realization.  
 
 
Figure 1: Model of Cultural Competence 
  
As can be seen in figure one, these three domains consist of both culturalist and race-based concepts that 
are organized on a non-exclusive fashion. Whereas culture includes what we can call the four exes, all 
concepts related to subjective experience. Attitudes are more relationally based. Skills involve application 





3. An interpretive relational approach 
 
Engagement with a patient in the mental health context is both an interpretive and relational experience. 
On the one hand the clinician seeks to make clinical sense of what the client presents, and, on the other, it 
is through the interaction—the relationship—with the patient that the clinical process advances. 
3.1 Interpretation and hermeneutics 
 
We are interpretive creatures; we are always already in the process of trying to make sense of our world, 
implicitly, automatically, and unconsciously, a perspective common to both the cognitive sciences 
(Banaji, Blair, & Glaser, 1997; von Hecker et al., 1997) and hermeneutic philosophy (Gadamer, 1997; 
Weinsheimer, 1985).  We approach any new experience, any stimuli, and automatically organize it into a 







If asked what they see in the above image, most people will say they see a square (even if they are aware 
that there are four ¾ circles…). This is automatic, and it is impossible not to see the square that “does not 
really exist”. What this means, then, is that rather than seeing things “as they really are” we see them in 
accordance with our perceptual devices, on the basis of what is already known, consistent with previous 
experiences. In contrast with his “grand-mentor” Husserl, who maintained that the knowledge of 
“essences” would only be possible by "bracketing" all previous assumptions (Husserl, 1913),  Gadamer 
(1960) observed that in the human sciences there exists a “prejudice against prejudice”, inviting scientists 
to be aware of their prejudices through analyzing the context where they work. Rorty (1987) held that we 
are all of us “ethnocentric”, that is, we see and experience the world from our own particular perspective.  
Research in the area of the “social” brain shows that social interaction (which, by definition, is cultural) 
influences synaptogenesis and synaptic pruning (Dawson, Ashman, & Carver, 2000), to the extent, for 
example that by one year of age the capacity for hearing language sounds is largely determined (Kuhl, 
2010) (see also chapter Han). 
 
3.1 Relational/dialogical perspective 
 
In recent years, something of a “relational revolution” has been taking place in the human sciences, in 
which the self is understood as fundamentally relational or intersubjective, as opposed to the Cartesian 
notion of a bounded, in effect “separate” individual (Mitchell, 2000; Orange, Atwood, & Stolorow, 2001; 
Suchman, 2006; Yonteff, 2002), a perspective that is lent support in the neurosciences in the study of the 
social brain and mirror neurons (Cozolino, 2006). 
 
A relational perspective holds that in effect, as expressed by the African proverb, “I am because we are, 
and since we are, therefore I am” (Hord & Lee, 1995). The idea is that humans are always already in 
relationship starting from our entry into the world (and some would argue that it is also the case during 
gestation). The perspective holds that it is not simply internal drives or programming, , but rather our 
relational history which in turn impacts our being, at every level, as we saw with the example about 
language that results in us being who and how we are. As relational creatures, we are not simply onion-
like layered selves that have a particular form (though it may be hidden over); how we are at any given 
moment in time is in part influenced by the specific interaction in which we are engaging. Hubert 
Hermans, in his model of the dialogical self (Hermans, Kempen, & Van Loon, 1992), defines the self as 
extending beyond the skin, to the extent that it includes significant and influential others; that which I see 
and experience is, in effect, part of my self. 
 
For mental health care, one of the strong implications of this approach is that as relational beings, we 
impact and affect each other. The notion of “mutuality” holds that clinician and patient, in their mutual 
interaction, have an effect on each other (Aron, 1992; Qureshi, 2005). To that end, a patient’s enactments 
in a clinical encounter will in part be related to the nature of the interaction with the clinician. The clinical 
process, therefore, will require that the clinician attend not only to the patient’s symptom presentation, 
personal and cultural history and the like, but also to her or his impact on the patient. 
 
As can be seen, the interpretive-relational approach shifts the vision of our clinical work, to how we 
engage with the other, and to that extent cultural competence training will be focalized around the 
development of the therapeutic relationship. Personal experience as trainers as well as some anecdotal 
evidence indicates that the biggest barriers to cultural competence may indeed be both personal and 
contextual. Chun (2010), for example, in her discussion of developing cultural competence training for 
surgeons, notes that she was surprised by the considerable resistance among trainees that she encountered 
as she attempted to establish an cultural competency training initiative. It would appear that many people 
overtly assert that they do not perceive such training as valuable. She also observed that people resisted 
the “self-exploration” aspect of the training, apparently related to the fear that they would be labelled as a 
“racist”. It would appear that a “politically correct” context in which there is strong social pressure to 




Research from a variety of fronts indicates that one of the most devastating sources of health disparities is 
racism (Dovidio et al., 2008; Institute of Medicine, 2002; Kenneth, Klap, Koike, & Sherbourne, 2001; 
Miranda, McGuire, Williams, & Wang, 2008; Simpson, Krishnan, Kunik, & Ruiz, 2007). Patients receive 
differential treatment due to their perceived group membership; and in that respect, immigrants and ethnic 
minorities receive a poorer quality of care.  The disparity shows up as poorer access, a lower likelihood of 
receiving needed care, and when treated, reception of poorer quality of care (Drummond, 1988; 
Redmond, Galea, & Delva, 2009; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2001; Whaley, 1998). 
That health disparities in mental health care are in part due to racism may appear counterintuitive given 
that mental health professionals are overwhelmingly liberal in political orientation (Redding, 2001), and 
as such profess a decidedly anti-racist sentiment. At the same time, there is a growing body of research 
indicating that even the best intentioned amongst us are prone to respond differently to people of different 
races and backgrounds, showing a preference for people “like themselves” and greater discomfort from 
those whose appearance is distinct (Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002; Dovidio, Kawakami, 
& Gaertner, 2002; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Nail, Harton, & Decker, 2003).  
Research in the area of “aversive racism” (Dovidio, 2001; Dovidio, Gaertner, et al., 2002) and implicit 
attitudes (Banaji, et al., 1997; Greenwald, et al., 2009) differentiate between behaviour that is under 
explicit or conscious control, and that which is not. A pencil-and-paper instrument that assesses racism is 
under conscious control, as is any verbalized expression of attitudes. In the mental health profession in 
particular and in most Western democracies in general, overt expressions of racism are considered to be 
both personally and socially repugnant. At the same time, and despite the best of intentions, most people 
express an own-group preference and discomfort and differential treatment of people from “different” 
racial groups than their own. In effect, our cognitive and emotional processes are impacted by our own 
histories of socialization in cultures, which denigrate immigrants, and ethnic minorities in 
contradistinction to majority group members who are depicted as capable and meritorious. The various 
tests of unconscious racism developed over the past decade or so utilize reaction time, skin conductance 
and other physiological indicators that are beyond conscious control (e.g. Implicit Association Test, 
accessible online at the Project Implicit website, http://projectimplicit.net). A growing body of research, 
although small, nevertheless strongly indicates that despite our liberal bent, mental health professionals 
are as prone to implicit racism as anyone else (Boysen, 2009; Penner et al., 2010; van Ryn & Fu, 2003).  
 
Two related and useful concepts are those of “racial microaggressions” and racial or ethnocultural 
countertransference. The former concerns behaviours or statements made, in general, by majority group 
members that are experienced by a person of colour as offensive or hurtful, whereas for the perpetrator 
the behaviour is viewed as benign (Harris, 2008; Sue, Capodilupo, & Holder, 2008; Sue et al., 2007). In 
the mental health context researchers have begun to chronicle the ways in which clinicians unwittingly 
“aggress” against their ethnic minority and patients (Constantine, 2007; Sue, et al., 2007).  Included are 
comments such as “you are a credit to your race”, minimization of the patient’s experience of racism, a 
“colour-blind” response to the patient (“I do not notice a person’s race, rather who they are as a person”). 
To that end, a growing body of research associates a colour-blind stance on the therapist’s part with lower 
levels of perceived empathy  (Burkard & Knox, 2004) and cultural competence (Beutler, 1981) 
 
“Countertransference” has a psychoanalytic conceptual basis, however, as applied to racial and cultural 
difference, simply refers to any clinician reactions that are not related to the patient him or herself. Given 
that racial difference is rife with uncomfortable associations, particularly for liberal clinicians, it is 
posited that we compensate for the discomfort provoked by race related material by transferring onto the 
patient a response that is less threatening (Altman, 1999; Comas-Diaz & Jacobsen, 1991; Gorkin, 1996; 
Holmes, 2001). What this means is that we lose sight of the patient and respond to our projections, even 
though these may be overtly benign, for example, responding to the patient’s culture with considerable 
interest (“oh, I just love [fill in the blank] culture, it is so interesting”). 
 
What all of this means is that our attitudes have a tremendous impact on our clinical work with immigrant 
and ethnic minority patients, to the extent that the American Psychological Association in their 
Guidelines on Multicultural Education, Training, Research, Practice, and Organizational Change for 
Psychologists, in which the guideline #1 states: 
 
“Psychologists are encouraged to recognize that, as cultural beings, they may hold attitudes and 
beliefs that can detrimentally influence their perceptions of and interactions with individuals 
who are ethnically and racially different from themselves “(American Psychological 
Association, 2003). 
 
Addressing race and prejudice in training is complicated, in large part because of the very strong societal 
taboo that exists concerning race and racism. It is not only the case that we are prejudiced, but also we 
live in a society in which discussion of “race” is highly controversial, to the extent that many people insist 
that race does not exist and must not be discussed. From the perspective of training in cultural 
competence, semantics are important to the extent that they hinder or help in the exploration of and 
attention to racist and other such beliefs. 
 
4.1 Cultural competence training and race 
 
One of the pitfalls of anti-racism training has been that it has adopted a moral-ideological perspective, in 
which trainees are told that they are racists and must adopt a non-racist approach (Bennett & Keating, 
2009). The impact of such an approach more often than not is to provoke a highly defensive reaction on 
the one hand, and a rift between the trainee and trainer; the former feels attacked whereas the latter acts as 
a crusader. 
 
The research reviewed, combined with the interpretive or hermeneutic approach (Christopher, 2001), 
demonstrates that having prejudices is not “bad”, but rather simply part of the human condition. That is to 
say, training is not about adopting a certain moral stance but rather striving towards maximizing clinical 
competence. To that end it is recommended that trainees adopt a collaborative, non-judgemental, and 
supportive stance, providing trainees with a forum in which to express and explore frustrations, 
difficulties, and fears associated with race and culture. 
 
Effectively addressing such issues in the training context demands the creation of a non-threatening 
environment in which trainees feel safe to express their “true” feelings. This, in turn, demands that the 
trainers themselves have engaged in and indeed are engaging in a similar process. One approach is that of 
the “lab”, a sort of group-process, in which trainees are invited to explore their feelings and reactions 
related to “diversity” (Carter, 2003). A process orientation means that participants are encouraged to 
explore and process their feelings and thoughts with an eye to understanding how they interfere with 
clinical work.  
 
5. Cultural filters: Attitudes and humility; knowledge 
 
From the hermeneutic perspective, we see and experience the world on the basis of what we already 
know, through our interpretive filters. Although much of biomedicine has long staked a claim to 
“objectivity” and “evidence based” practices, this stance is increasingly questioned (Haraway, 1988; 
Howard, 1991). If indeed it is the case, as argued here that experience is culturally circumscribed, then it 
follows that our interaction with the world is always “from our point of view”; that a “bird’s-eye” view is 
simply the perspective of a bird (and not how things really are). Following this line, then, comes the 
central notion that our experience of and interaction with the world is very much a function of what could 
be termed our cultural filters, sometimes called worldviews, cultural values, psychological constructs, 
value orientations, or narratives (Frankl, 1977; Kelly, 1955; Kirmayer, 2007; Koltko-Rivera, 2004). 
 
Taken from this perspective, the Western trained psychiatrist or psychologist will “see” the immigrant 
patient both from her or his perspective as a “Westerner” and as a psychiatrist or psychologist. Likewise, 
Nancy Andreasson (2007) recently lamented the “death of phenomenology” given that psychiatrists are 
trained to identify mental disorders on the basis of the DSM system; our training and the overall 
perspective taken therein circumscribes how we “see” the patient. 
 
Thus from the very outset, it becomes essential that trainees are willing to accept their “situatedness”, 
their ethnocentrism, that they see things from a particular perspective, which may constitute the truth in a 
particular professional context, but not the Truth as it “really is”. Indeed, it is worth noting that the quest 
for the Truth and the assumption that the Truth can be accessed by way of the correct application of the 
best practice, are themselves “cultural values”. 
 
The need for perspectivality is all the more pronounced given the “play” of culture. Knowledge in the 
cultural competence model presented here is primarily related to the how, or at least possible hows, rather 
than any concrete “whats”. Thus specific “knowledge” about a given culture may be useful, however, 
only if deployed in a—you guessed it—culturally competent manner. Knowing about the general impact 
on different facets of life as related to mental health and its care can provide a useful framework through 
which one can make sense of things. It is worth noting that as clinicians we can be aware that culture 
impacts experience, expression, and explanation of mental illness and distress in general, but we cannot 
know “how” or even “what” only knowing a person’s cultural membership.  It makes no sense to say that 
“Nigerians experience anxiety in such and so a way”, or that “Germans express social stress in such and 
so a way”. What we can say is that a given individual’s experience is culturally circumscribed something 




In a rather provocative statement, metaphor commentators Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that we 
never experience “the things themselves”, but rather do so culturally: 
 
“… every experience takes place within a vast background of cultural presuppositions….Cultural 
assumptions, values, and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place 
upon experience as we choose. It would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural 
through and through, that we experience our 'world' in such a way that our culture is already 
present in the very experience itself” (p.57). 
 
Second order cybernetics from Heinz von Foerster (1981) could be useful to understand this concept. 
According to this author “a brain is required to write a theory of a brain”. In other words, whether we 
realize it or not, when we analyze others we implicitly analyze ourselves. 
 
The current perspective on the interrelationship between “nature” and “nurture”, on the “cultural” or 
“social” brain provides further weight to this perspective. By now it would appear that we know that our 
experience impacts our biology, just as our biology impacts our experience. What this means is that 
experience itself is “cultural”, or to put it another way, there is no such thing as “pure” experience, and 




How we express ourselves, our emotion, our distress, even our psychopathology is in large part related to 
cultural norms (Furst, 2002; Katz et al., 1988). It has been reasonably well established that “idioms of 
distress” are culturally circumscribed (See also chapter Bäärnhielm). Once again, this is not to say that 
there is a Spanish way of expressing fear, but rather that what we consider normative for the expression of 
emotion or distress is exactly that, normative within a particular group. In psychiatry we are alert for “flat 
affect” “anhedonia” “emotional lability” and a discrepancy between affect and speech content. All of 
these involve cultural norms, that is, what may be “flat affect” for the emotionally volatile Spaniard may 
be normative emotional expression for the even-keeled and stoic Swede, if we may succumb to 
generalizations.  
 
Not only the intensity of expression but also the content of expression is culturally circumscribed. In the 
West, where the Cartesian mind-body dualism is the norm, psychological expression of distress is pretty 
much standard. In many parts of the world, however, there is no such dualism, and distress is simply 
distress, with no clear division between somatic and psychic (Kirmayer & Groleau, 2001).  
 
What constitutes a symptom and how that symptom is related to a given mental disorder also comes into 
play. In the DSM-IV an appendix includes “Culture bound syndromes” such as ataque de nervios, koro. 
These, along with, some would argue, disorders such as anorexia nervosa or borderline personality, 
comprise culture-specific symptom-pathology matches and constellations that are not universal (Mezzich 
et al., 1999) (See also chapter Mezzich). 
 
Clearly, there is no way to ascertain a priori how anyone will express their distress, and making sense of 
said expression is not necessarily all that easy, particularly in the face of cultural difference. No recipe 
book is available; however, the culturally competent clinician will be interpreting the expression of 




As experience and expression of emotion and distress varies cross-culturally, it follows that the 
explanations that are given for why distress is experienced do as well (Bhui & Bhugra, 2002; Dinh & 
Groleau, 2008). How a patient explains what is happening to him or her will in large part depend on his or 
her world-view. Although there are clear cross-cultural tendencies, one need not travel far—perhaps 
down the hall—to find different explanatory models (see chapters Bäärhielm, Balkir). Indeed, in Western 
mental health we see biological, psychological, social, and systems explanations, with greater or lesser 
degrees of convergence. That is to say, once again it is not that culture x uses a supernatural explanation 
for mental distress whereas culture y uses a social one, rather it is a question of tendencies, tendencies 
that shows specific patterns (McCabe & Priebe, 2004).  
 
This would appear to be all the more pronounced across cultures, such that the source of the problem is 
viewed very differently. Given the variation in cultural values, and given the modernist paradigm (in 
which psychiatry is soundly situated), it follows that many patients hold divergently different views on 
the source, cause, and even nature of their distress.  
 
Perhaps the most relevant here for training are two related issues. One is that a person who says that he or 
she is ill because of hex, astrology, having walked near a humid zone, the evil eye, and so on is not 
necessarily “crazy”, simple minded, gullible, or any such thing, but rather may well be expressing and 
culturally normative way of explaining that one is hungry.  
 
The second is that what constitutes a “symptom” in the DSM-IV may not in another culture. That is to 
say, the combination of a supernatural based explanation and expression may appear to be symptomatic 
of mental illness whereas it is simply culturally normative expression and explanation of a non-




What people expect about their interaction with the mental health professional, the nature of the reatment, 
and the course of the “problem” can vary considerably, and largely as a function of cultural difference. 
The very notion of a weekly office visit in which the patient talks about their personal problems with a 
stranger itself is specific to a particular cultural context.  
 
There is an increased attention to both patient- and relationship-centred care (Suchman, 2006), in which 
the therapeutic relationship is viewed as collateral and constituted by patient and clinician collaboration, 
although consistent with the anti-hierarchical and power differential values endemic in many 
contemporary therapeutic approaches. This tendency runs decidedly against the grain for many from more 
hierarchical and authoritarian cultures, e.g. to the extent that patients have been known to insist on 
referring to the psychologist as “doctor”, eschewing the use of first names, and questioning the utility of 
talking, of a focus on insight, exploration of emotions, experience, and the like (Sue, Ivey, & Pederson, 
1996). Many patients specifically expect that their psychologist or psychiatrist will provide them with 
advice and concrete suggestions—after all, they are the experts—as to how they can reduce their distress 
and live more effective lives. 
 
Expectations about the course of the distress can also vary which are often intimately related to the 
explanation or understanding of the basis of the distress. From a medical perspective, in which illness is a 
function of some sort of internal biological or psychological dysfunction, the presence of 
symptomatology at any given moment is not necessarily indicative of an absence of the disease entity; 
remission does not equal cured. From a “demonic” perspective, this is not necessarily the case; absence of 
symptoms in a given moment most likely indicates an absence of possession, hex, and so forth. What this 
means, then, is that a patient whose expectation and understanding of distress diverges from that of 
Western biomedicine may discontinue treatment not because he or she “lack insight” or is “resistant”, but 
rather because of cultural difference. 
 
5.5 Training issues in the context of the cultural context of experience, expression, explanation and 
expectations 
 
The central premise concerning the four exes is that cultural fundamentally circumscribes how a person 
experiences and makes sense of their distress. A post-modern or relativist perspective would train 
clinicians to understand that, in the words of George Howard, a demonic or supernatural explanatory 
model is as valid as a psychiatric one. Although this may make heuristic sense, in our daily clinical work, 
we are not shamans or mystics but Western trained mental health professionals, meaning that we operate 
from a fundamentally distinct epistemic paradigm. The challenge, then, is to adopt what Rorty (1986 
) calls a “benign” ethnocentric attitude. To that end, trainees must learn to appreciate the broad variety of 
possible ways of experiencing, expressing, and explaining mental distress without opening their minds so 
much, that, as Rorty laments, their “brains fall out”. 
 
The central challenge is one of self-awareness, of excavating one’s epistemic filter such that one has a 
sense of “where one is coming from”, while at the same time having the capacity to differentiate between 
psychopathology and culturally normative behavior. There is no “easy way out” of this conundrum, 
precisely because what is normal for one person may be downright strange for another. This does not 
mean, however, that the strange is simply “cultural”—such a stance of extreme relativism can result in 
severe underdiagnosis. Yet at the same time, there is a very clear risk of overdiagnosis if cultural variation 
is not taken into consideration. 
 
 
6. Cultural competency training, political correctness, and stress 
 
In much of the European context, most clinicians’ first contact with “cultural competence training” may 
well be post-graduate, once they are working in the field. Given the nature of mental health budgets, this 
all too often also means that they are working under considerable work stress, with a high patient load. 
When a high patient load is combined with patients coming from other countries and cultures, this can 
exponentially increment the resultant stress and lead to burn-out.  
 
All too often, the training context is one in which the trainers are implicitly or explicitly proffering the 
message that they are “less racist”, more “culturally on the ball” etc. than the trainees. The trainer often 
comes across as holier-than-thou, she or he who spews forth politically correct cant to such an extent and 
with such fervour that what trainees end up learning is to abide by the cant, by the politically correct 
narrative. Although this may be vaguely coherent from an institutional demand for compliance with state 
mandates, it is at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive. The danger of such an approach is that 
it creates a distance between trainer and trainee, in which the latter is being told (a) that he or she is bad 
for having racist thoughts or feelings, and, that (b) prejudices must be eliminated completely. Evidently, 
such an approach is rarely effective. It may change the explicit behaviour; however, the implicit attitudes 
do not change. What may come up here is that trainers are no more “free” from prejudice than is anyone 
else. To that end, trainers must always adopt a dose of “cultural humility” (Tervalon & Murray-Garcia, 
1998) and recognize that none of us are prejudice free, that we are always responded from our subjective 
perspective, and simply spouting the “right words” is only operating at the explicit level, and the real 
change is represented by implicit behaviour change, not just external. This is all to underscore the 
importance of the creation of an open, safe, comfortable, and collaborative learning environment.  
 
Participants need to feel safe, feel that it is acceptable for them to express their thoughts and feelings. If 
the message they get is that talking political correctness is what gets valued, then there is little hope of 
much progress. Getting beyond the prejudice against prejudice is essential, what is important is 
recognition and acceptance that we all of us experience and interpret the world through our own 
(prejudiced) filters, and as such the key first step is acknowledgment of this. Therefore, the issue is not 
that we “should not be prejudiced” but rather that we need to be open to how we engage with the world 




The main job of the trainer is to create a safe, open space in which dialogue can flow freely, in which 
participants do not feel judged, do not feel afraid of expressing feelings and opinions that may run counter 
to those that are socially normative. Our experience as trainers shows that even the most politically 
committed clinician is at least somewhat ambivalent about these issues, and sharing this ambivalence 
between colleagues who are committed to providing their patients with a high quality of care is liberating. 
The discourse then shifts from one of “I shouldn’t feel like this” to “OK, given that I sometimes feel like 
this, what can I do, as a clinician, to improve the services I provide?”.  Cultural competence, as discussed 
in this chapter, is more concerned with how the clinician interacts with patients than with what she or he 
knows about the patients’ cultures. It is argued that effective clinical care, particularly when working with 
patients from diverse backgrounds, demands self-awareness and as such self-exploration. Exploration and 
interrogation of prejudices allows clinicians greater freedom by which to become aware of and therefore 
alter those prejudices that impede effective clinical care. Cultural competence is not an end-point but 
rather a process; not something to be achieved, but rather, in the spirit of cultural humility, an orienting 
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